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Abstract 
Although prior information security research predominantly focuses on organizational in-role security 
behaviors (e.g., information security policy (ISP) compliance), the role of extra-role security behav-
iors – secure actions unspecified in ISPs but beneficial to organizations – has not seen nearly as much 
attention. At the same time, employees’ awareness manifests itself as prerequisite for security behav-
ior but without research having really understood all of its potential impacts. Therefore this study ex-
amines the role of information security awareness (ISA) in enhancing extra-role security behaviors in 
addition to in-role security behaviors. In particular, we propose that general ISA enhances promotive 
extra-role security behaviors (i.e., helping and voice) and ISP awareness fosters prohibitive extra-role 
security behaviors (i.e., stewardship and whistle-blowing). Data was collected from a field study, 
where employees responded to incoming emails from co-workers and supervisors asking for password 
sharing, unsafe data sharing via private emails, as well as the use of private cloud services and unau-
thorized software. Our findings show that general ISA and ISP awareness are indeed driving both in-
role and extra-role security behaviors. We discuss our implications for theory and practice, and con-
clude with interesting avenues for further research. 
Keywords: Behavioral security, Extra-role security behaviors, Information security awareness, Infor-
mation security policy awareness. 
1 Introduction 
The human factor has become increasingly important in the continuous effort to make business infor-
mation systems (IS) more secure. In particular, employees have the dual role of being allies and 
sources of threat to IS security since many security-related incidents are attributed to employees’ in-
tentional or unintentional actions (Warkentin and Willison, 2009). Hence, an increasingly critical ob-
jective for organizations appears to be both reducing IS threats caused by employees and educating 
their employees towards becoming secure IS users. A key non-technical measure to achieve this dual 
objective is to design and implement information security policies (ISPs). ISPs refer to statements of 
the employees’ roles and responsibilities in properly using and protecting organizational IS resources 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Consequently, ISP compliance and other behaviors specified by or associated 
with ISPs, subsumed under the term in-role security behaviors, have been the primary focus in extant 
research (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath and Rao, 2009).  
However, recent investigations by Hsu et al. (2015) have pointed out the quixotic act of trying to out-
line and control every possible security behavior in ISPs and emphasized the importance of extra-role 
security behaviors, which refer to security behaviors not specified in an ISP and not encouraged 
through rewards or punishments, for ISP effectiveness. Their research implies that an organization’s 
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information security can be further improved, when employees help each other and/or express voice 
by making innovative suggestions related to ISPs. Following the authors’ call to explore other types of 
extra-role security behaviors and drawing from Van Dyne et al. (1995)’s dimensionality of extra-role 
behavior, we extend Hsu et al. (2015)’s work on promotive extra-role security behaviors (i.e., helping 
and voicing) with prohibitive extra-role security behaviors (i.e., stewardship and whistle-blowing). 
Stewardship and whistle-blowing may be both important for organizational health, because the former 
protects other colleagues from harm, and the latter places previously undetected problems (e.g., a 
breach to security by an internal employee) on the organization’s agenda to be resolved (Liang et al., 
2012). In an information security context, prohibitive behaviors may be possibly more effective than 
promotive behaviors because, for instance, the process of helping others in learning the right behaviors 
specified in the ISPs or changing ISPs may require considerable time and effort. Due to ever emerging 
and frequently changing threats to information security, organization might not be able to afford this 
luxury. In contrast, stewardship and whistle-blowing call for stopping harm, thereby preventing the 
negative effects of “process losses” in a timely manner (Liang et al., 2012; Van Dyne et al., 1995). 
Yet, in the information security context it is still unclear, who is able and willing to perform these ex-
tra-role security behaviors. We argue that it is the employees who are aware of and committed to the 
security objectives of their organizations, which is commonly referred to as information security 
awareness (ISA) (Siponen, 2000). Users who are committed to the security objectives of their organi-
zation, should be more willing to perform activities outside of their regular in-role security behaviors 
to the benefit of the overall security (Hsu et al., 2015). Thus, our research question is: How does in-
formation security awareness impact extra-role security behaviors? 
We addressed the research question by conducting a field study, where employees were required to 
read and process business emails (similar to an e-tray exercise). Some of the requests in the emails 
violated the organization’s ISPs, such as requests from colleagues or supervisors asking for password 
sharing, unsafe data sharing via private emails or private cloud services, and use of unauthorized soft-
ware. By analyzing screen recordings, we were able to capture employees’ actual in-role and extra-
role security behaviors in response to these requests.  
Before we describe the design and results of our field study in more detail, we will briefly introduce 
the research background of our work and hypothesize the relationships in our research model. We 
conclude by discussing our implications for research and practice, along with interesting avenues for 
further research. 
2 Research Background 
2.1 Employees’ in- and extra-role security behaviors  
Behavioral information security research is in broad agreement that to secure information within an 
organization, appropriate ISPs need to be specified and employees need to be motivated to follow 
them (Boss et al., 2015; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Posey et al., 2013). Security activities specified by or 
associated with ISPs are considered as in-role security behaviors, which are required or expected be-
haviors and are the basis of regular and ongoing job performance (Hsu et al., 2015; Katz, 1964). Ex-
amples of in-role security behaviors include among others storing sensitive organizational information 
only on protected media or locations, protecting one’s computer-system account information by never 
giving it to others, or not using external software unless authorized to do so (Posey et al., 2013). In 
contrast, extra-role security behaviors are discretionary security activities, which are not specified by 
the ISPs and thus go beyond existing and explicit security-role expectation (Hsu et al., 2015).  
In general, extra-role behaviors in organizations are neither formally rewarded when performed nor 
punished when not performed (Van Dyne and LePine, 1998). Yet, supervisors value extra-role behav-
iors due to the fact that it is virtually impossible to anticipate and specify all desired employee behav-
iors. In their literature review of extra-role behaviors in organizations, Van Dyne et al. (1995) pro-
posed a two-dimensional typology, which distinguishes between affiliative/challenging and promo-
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tive/prohibitive extra-role behaviors. The first dimension contrasts whether the behavior would likely 
strengthen or preserve relationships with others (affiliative) or whether it creates a risk of damaging 
the relationship (challenging). The second dimension contrasts whether the behavior encourages some-
thing to occur (promotive) or to cease (prohibitive). Combining these characteristics yields a typology 
with four general types of extra-role behavior (see Table 1). 
 
 Promotive Prohibitive 
Affiliative Helping Stewardship 
Challenging Voice Whistle-blowing 
Table 1. A typology of extra-role behaviors (adapted from Van Dyne et al., 1995) 
Helping is an example of affiliative promotive behavior, which considers small acts in support of the 
work of others. It is cooperative behavior which builds and preserves relationships (Van Dyne et al., 
1995). This could involve informal assistance in work performance, such as voluntarily taking secure 
action for coworkers that help to prevent security violations or tips on how to act more securely. Voice 
is an example of challenging promotive behavior, which involves offering comments that may chal-
lenge the status quo but do so to improve a situation rather than criticize it (Van Dyne et al., 1995). In 
the security context, it is making suggestions for change and recommending modifications to ISPs 
(e.g., on data and password handling or software use). Stewardship is an example of affiliative pro-
hibitive behavior, where a more powerful, experienced or skilled employee prohibits or constrains a 
less powerful, experienced or skilled employee’s behavior with the intent of protecting her (Van Dyne 
et al., 1995). This could involve actively intervening in forbidden or unsecure actions, such as advising 
colleagues not to use an external cloud service, which may represent a security risk or even a violation 
of organizational ISPs. Whistle-blowing is an example of challenging prohibitive behavior, which is 
about confronting wrongdoings (Van Dyne et al., 1995). In an information security context, we refer 
to it as reporting behaviors that are in contravention with the ISPs committed by an internal employee 
to persons that may be able to effect action (e.g., superiors, information security officers).  
We chose to focus on these four extra-role behaviors for two reasons. First, we wanted to build on the 
theoretical framework developed by Van Dyne et al. (1995), so that our selection of types of extra-role 
behavior to study would be based on theory rather than on ad hoc criteria. Second, we believed that all 
four types of extra-role behavior are important in information security. While a recent study has con-
sidered promotive extra-role security behaviors (i.e., helping and voicing) (Hsu et al., 2015), to the 
best of our knowledge, prohibitive extra-role security behaviors have not yet received any attention in 
information security research. 
2.2 Information security awareness 
Information security awareness (ISA) is commonly defined as the degree to which employees are 
aware of and committed to their organization’s information security objectives, which is often ex-
pressed in organizational ISPs (Siponen, 2000). This understanding of commitment is based on Senge 
(1994), who regards an organization as a system where its members are not only committed to their 
own interests, but also to the common interest of the whole . Another way to conceptualize ISA is pro-
vided by Dinev and Hu (2007), who define it as an individual’s increased consciousness of and inter-
est in knowing about technological issues and strategies to deal with them. Thus, anyone who consid-
ers information as a valuable asset, should be aware of possible threats related to it (Siponen, 2001). 
Drawing from Siponen’s definition, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) additionally differentiate between employ-
ees’ general knowledge and understanding of security issues and their consequences (termed general 
ISA) as well as their cognizance of their organizations’ information security policies and its implica-
tions (termed ISP awareness) (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). As an illustration, employees may be generally 
aware that using third-party email systems and storage servers for business tasks is risky (General 
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ISA) but may not know that the organization requires that information must be secured according to a 
data protection standard or that users are prohibited from using external providers (ISP awareness). 
In prior security research, ISA has been identified as a major driver of varying security behaviors. Pre-
vious studies showed that ISA increases employees’ ISP compliance (Al-Omari et al., 2012; Bulgurcu 
et al., 2010; Haeussinger and Kranz, 2013; Putri and Hovav, 2014; Siponen, 2000), adoption of securi-
ty technologies (Dinev and Hu, 2007; Kumar et al., 2008; Maitland et al., 2012; Han et al., 2014) and 
desktop security behaviors (White et al., 2017; Hanus and Wu, 2016), as well as decreases access poli-
cy violations (Vance et al., 2013), problematic IS security behavior (Takemura, 2011) and IS misuse 
(D'Arcy et al., 2009; Hovav and D’Arcy, 2012). Departing from prior studies that mainly focused on 
ISA to investigate in-role security behaviors, we examine whether ISA can promote extra-role security 
behaviors in addition to in-role security behaviors.  
3 Hypotheses Development 
3.1 Effect of ISA on in-role security behaviors 
Extant research has largely concluded that employees’ awareness is one of the most fundamental pre-
requisites for security behaviors of all kind and in particular plays a key role for employees’ in-role 
security behaviors (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Dinev and Hu, 2007; Siponen, 2000). 
For example, D'Arcy et al. (2009) position awareness as a critical outcome toward ISP compliance, 
citing its importance for understanding ISPs that govern behavior. In particular, they find that users’ 
awareness of security countermeasures (including ISPs, awareness programs, and computer monitor-
ing) reduces information systems misuse. Employees’ awareness of monitoring and evaluation as part 
of accountability mechanisms was found to reduce their intention to commit ISP violations (Vance et 
al., 2013). Users’ awareness about potential risks and threats of harmful technologies was found to 
directly determine the intention to use protective information technologies (Dinev and Hu, 2007). Bul-
gurcu et al. (2010) examined the effect of ISA (consisting of the two dimensions of general ISA and 
ISP awareness) on employees’ ISP compliance. Although their model focused on the effects of three 
outcome beliefs, it shows a strong positive effect of awareness on employees’ compliance attitudes 
and intentions. By further shedding light on the mediating effect of attitude on the relationship be-
tween ISA and compliant intentions, attitude is found only a partial mediator. It is thus reasonable to 
propose that individuals who are both more cognizant of information security threats (general ISA) 
and their organization’s ISPs (ISP awareness) are more likely to follow them and perform in-role secu-
rity behaviors. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1a: General ISA positively impacts in-role security behaviors. 
Hypothesis 1b: ISP awareness positively impacts in-role security behaviors. 
3.2 Effect of general ISA on promotive extra-role security behaviors 
In collaborative working environments, an employee’s work outcomes might by influenced by her 
coworkers’ performance. One member’s failing to perform specified ISP behaviors may undermine 
the department’s or even the overall organizational information security (Bachrach et al., 2006). For 
example, unsafe data sharing or storage among group members can lead to leaking of sensitive infor-
mation with detrimental consequences for the group or the organization as a whole (e.g., loss of cus-
tomer trust or lawsuits). This illustration indicates that, when an incident occurs, an employee’s organ-
izational environment can be harmed, even when she is not directly responsible for it.  
An employee with a high awareness of information security threats and its consequences is at the same 
time cognizant of the broad consequences of her colleagues’ acts on her, other co-workers or the or-
ganization as a whole. In this sense, awareness is not mere knowledge but also includes a deeper un-
derstanding of interdependencies from a more holistic mind set. She should then have a better under-
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standing how she can assist others and avoid interference with her own work (Hsu et al., 2015). That 
is, when a co-worker asks an individual to perform a task with potentially threatening consequences, 
highly-aware employees might point employees in the direction of other, more secure alternatives that 
both support their work and protect the organization. Also having a more comprehensive understand-
ing of security threats and consequences and how formal internal authorities in the organization (e.g. 
IT department, top management) are dealing with it can lead to helping behavior, if the individual does 
not have confidence in their acting as being efficient and effective for supporting colleagues and peers. 
However, when employees are not able to help their colleagues directly, they need someone with more 
formal power to deal with the problems they have identified (Detert and Burris, 2007). An “awareness 
of problems”, which is in our context an awareness of information security threats and its consequenc-
es, has been found to guide the development of groups that strongly advocate for policies that reduce 
such problems (Biglan and Taylor, 2000; Dinev and Hu, 2007). An essential step here is to thoroughly 
articulate the identified problem by extensively communicating to the groups that matter (Biglan and 
Taylor, 2000). Being aware of information security threats and its consequences (i.e., awareness of 
problems) drives suggestions from employees to groups that matter to constructively challenge the 
status quo of information security. Drawing on the illustration above, such suggestions might include 
innovative solutions on how to handle data sharing or storage. 
In conclusion, employees with high levels of general ISA should be more motivated to pay attention to 
threats to information security in a collaborative context and thus engage in promotive extra-role secu-
rity behaviors including secure acts in the support of others’ work (i.e., helping) and/or speaking up to 
improve organizational functioning (i.e., voicing). Thus: 
Hypothesis 2a: General ISA positively impacts the promotive extra-role security behavior of helping. 
Hypothesis 2b: General ISA positively impacts the promotive extra-role security behavior of voice. 
3.3 Effect of ISP awareness on prohibitive extra-role security behaviors 
ISPs serve as educational tools, because they clarify which behaviors enhance or weaken an organiza-
tion’s information security. Most importantly, they inform employees of their particular role and re-
sponsibility in properly using and protecting organization security. They allow employees to under-
stand what they are they are expected to do and further serve as an indicator of the consequences of 
inappropriate conduct (e.g., formal sanctions) (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Johnston et al., 2013).  
Employees who understand that it is everyone’s responsibility to contribute to the overall security of 
the organization will execute prohibitive influence against inappropriate activities that threaten the 
organization’s information security. When policy-aware employees observe wrongdoings from col-
leagues who fail to do what is expected of them, they would provide directional instructions intended 
to stop actions that could cause harm, i.e. they would engage in stewardship behaviors due to a differ-
ence in power. Rather than position power or personal power, this difference is based on the more 
knowledgeable status of the steward compared to the less knowledgeable status of the wrongdoer (Van 
Dyne et al., 1995). Put differently, the more policy-aware employee directs the less aware employee 
by trying to constrain his actions with the intent of protecting her and the organization. For example, 
she could advise her colleague who does not know better not to use unauthorized software, as it is a 
violation of organizational ISPs.  
While employees may be aware of the ISPs, they may lack the position or personal power (French et 
al., 1968) to enforce them among colleagues. Also, they may have a lack of confidence that their col-
leagues can solve the problematic behavior and the consequences thereof alone, either because they 
are not able to due to their lack of awareness or unwilling. In this case, as “law-abiding citizens”, poli-
cy-aware employees may see it as their duty to safeguard the organization’s interest and engage in in-
ternal whistle-blowing by reporting wrongdoing to the proper authority (Dozier and Miceli, 1985). For 
example, policy-aware employees may perceive that their colleagues’ unauthorized installation of 
software or sharing customer data via unsecure channels is wrongful conduct and report it to their su-
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perior or security officers to prevent further detrimental consequences and/or prevent problematic be-
haviors from taking place again.  
In conclusion, employees with high levels of ISP awareness should be more motivated to pay attention 
to ISP violations in a collaborative context and thus engage in prohibitive extra-role security behaviors 
including constraining colleagues’ behavior with the intent of protecting her (i.e., stewardship) and/or 
reporting ISP violations to the proper authority (i.e., whistleblowing). Thus we propose: 
Hypothesis 3a: ISP awareness positively impacts the prohibitive extra-role security behavior of stew-
ardship. 
Hypothesis 3b: ISP awareness positively impacts with the prohibitive extra-role security behavior of 
whistle-blowing. 
Corresponding with prior information security literature we also use age and gender as control varia-
bles for behavior (e.g., D'Arcy et al., 2009). Additionally, we control for the Big Five personality 
traits following extant literature, which established a link between the Big Five personality traits and 
in-role security behaviors such as ISP compliance (Johnston et al., 2016), as well as on extra-role be-
haviors (Chiaburu et al., 2011). 
4 Research Methodology 
To test our hypotheses, we followed a multi-method approach consisting of a field study together with 
a post-study survey. In the following, we will provide demographic information of our participants, 
describe our study design, and explain our constructs and measurements. 
4.1 Demographics of the participants 
Data has been collected from a field study with 107 employees in organizations of 10 sectors, includ-
ing financial services (n = 57), education (n = 24), manufacturing (n = 7), government (n = 4), energy 
(n = 3), retail (n = 2), and others (n = 8). Participation was voluntary and anonymous and the employ-
ees were told that the purpose of the study is academic research and that independent university schol-
ars would conduct the study and analyze the results. The sample includes 58 men and 49 women, with 
an average age of 40 years (SD 10 years). In regards to the career status, 43 were administrative 
clerks, 6 were young professionals (university degree and up to five years job experience), 42 were 
professionals (university degree and more than five years job experience), 8 had a managing position, 
and 8 opted out of answering. In terms of the highest level of education, 2 had a PhD, 50 had a mas-
ter’s degree, 6 had a bachelor’s degree, 24 were high school graduates, and 22 were secondary school 
graduates or similar, and 3 opted out of answering. The participants in our sample use a computer at 
work for 6.55 hours per day on average (SD 2.41), and owns an average of 3.36 email accounts (SD 
2.42). Table 2 presents demographic information of the employees in percentage. 
 
Gender % Age % Highest level of education % Career status % 
Male 54.2 < 20 1.9 Less than high school degree 20.6 Trainee 0.9 
Female 45.8 20-29 8.4 High School degree or similar 22.4 (Administrative) clerk 40.2 
30-39 26.2 Bachelor‘s degree or similar 5.6 Young professional 5.6 
40-49 28.0 Master‘s degree or similar 46.7 Professional  39.3 
50-59 21.5 Doctorate degree 1.9 Manager 7.5 
60-69 4.7 Others 2.8 Others 5.5 
n.s. 9.3 
Table 2. Demographic information of the participants (n=107) 
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4.2 Study design 
The participants were informed that the study’s goal is to study human behavior while processing 
emails and browsing on websites. All participants gave their consent that screen activities on the com-
puter would be recorded during the task. In the consent form, we also emphasized that participation is 
voluntary and they could withdraw from the study at any stage without penalty, and that data is pro-
tected in terms of anonymity and confidentiality. The institutions’ data protection officer was consult-
ed and gave her approval prior to the experiments. By recording screen activities, we were able to ana-
lyze all behavioral actions and code the in-role and extra-role security behaviors, as described in the 
next subsection.  
Participants received an e-tray exercise similar to other role play scenario experiments (Downs et al., 
2006), in which they took the role of an employee at a fictional company, and were required to read 
and process 20 emails that were stored in the inbox of a webmail server. In order to design our email 
tasks in our study setting as appropriate as possible for the involved employees, we gathered anony-
mous examples of internal email exchange within the organizations, where we conducted the field 
study. For tasks within emails that prompt to access a website with usernames and passwords, usable 
accounts were provided. Further, files for the study were created and located on the desktop of the 
computer. A short description of the relationship between the participant and his peers, supervisors, 
and IT helpdesk was provided, including their names, emails, department, and closeness of the rela-
tionship).  
For the purpose of this study, the set of emails included nine requests (see Table 3) from six col-
leagues and three supervisors that violate the ISPs of the participants’ organizations, which prescribe 
storing sensitive corporate information only on protected media or locations (e.g., protected server), no 
installing of external software on computer unless authorized to do so, no writing down or sharing sys-
tem login information, among other things.  
 
# Subject From Request (summarized) 
1 Trainee applications Boss 
Send two application documents with curriculum vitae for a train-
ee position to boss’s private email. 
2 
Excel file of existing 
clients 
Peer 
Send return on investment calculation file to colleague’s private 
email. 
3 New password safe! Peer 
Use the recommended but unauthorized password safe in the at-
tachment (.exe file) for storing passwords. 
4 
Last meeting proto-
col? 
Peer Send file of meeting protocol to colleague’s private email. 
5 
Urgent: help with 
intranet access 
Boss 
Submit own password to help Boss with a very important and ur-
gent project. 
6 
Equity finance con-
cept for client 
Boss Send financial plan file for a customer to Boss’s private email. 
7 Password? Peer Send password to a dear colleague in order to quickly help her. 
8 
Invitation to the 
Dropbox-Group 
Peer 
Join Dropbox-Group for Business and upload company-sensitive 
information and a picture of a team event. 
9 Excel list with access Peer 
Share password with work group in excel file because everyone 
has access to different platforms making collaboration difficult. 
Table 3. Features of Emails 
4.3 Constructs and measurement 
In contrast to and as requested by prior research (e.g., Crossler et al., 2013) we were able to measure 
participants’ actual in-role and extra-role security behaviors. In coding their in-role and extra-role se-
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curity behaviors we went through the screen recordings of each participant manually and coded the 
behavior for each individual email. To establish trustworthiness and credibility of our in-role and ex-
tra-role security behavior constructs, we employed principles of data and research triangulation (Lin-
coln and Guba, 1985). For data triangulation we constantly compared screen-recordings (e.g., email 
replies) with related definitions and items on in-role and extra-role behaviors. With regard to in-role 
security behavior, when possible, we drew from Posey et al. (2013)’s taxonomy for protection-
motivated behaviors. As an illustration, we considered behavior ID 57 (“an employee protects his/her 
computer-system account information by never giving it to other individuals”) and ID1 (“an employee 
does not write his/her system login information down”), when participants were asked to share their 
password with their supervisor (Email #5), co-worker (Email #7) or the group (Email #9). In coding 
extra-role security behaviors, we followed Van Dyne et al. (1995)’s typology and contrasted affiliative 
promotive behaviors (i.e., helping), challenging promotive behaviors (i.e., voice), affiliative prohibi-
tive behaviors (i.e., stewardship), and challenging prohibitive behaviors (i.e., whistleblowing). For 
research triangulation, two scholars carried out each coding stage independently. We frequently and 
extensively discussed our coding outcomes, and integrated the coding plans after each coding stage.  
In-role security behavior was coded as 1, when a participant did not follow the request in the email by 
(1) deleting it, (2) archiving it, (3) answering that he cannot follow the request, or (4) not doing any-
thing and moving on to the next email. In contrast, in-role security behavior was coded as 0, when a 
participant (1) immediately followed the request in the email as asked and thereby violated the organi-
zation’s ISPs or (2) tried to find some form of workaround they thought would be safer but still violat-
ed ISPs (e.g., by answering that they would rather share the password via telephone or encrypting the 
file but still sending it to a private email account).  
Helping behavior was coded as 1, when a participant did not follow the request in the email but took 
actions in support of the requester’s work (Van Dyne et al., 1995). These kind of actions included (1) 
providing an alternative solution to the request (e.g., sending files to the secure business email instead 
of the private email, tips to use the organization’s private cloud instead of the public cloud, tips to use 
the organization’s authorized password safe instead of the unauthorized one); (2) offering assistance 
by asking to transfer the needed information via another communication channel (e.g., telephone) or 
offering to talk on how to handle the request in another way; or (3) providing guidance to the helpdesk 
or other IT-affine colleagues that could help.  
Voice behavior was coded as 1, when participants did not follow the request in the email but provided 
comments intended to improve the current state to others, such as the supervisor, helpdesk or multiple 
colleagues. These comments included innovative suggestions for change (Van Dyne et al., 1995). Par-
ticipants recommended to have a group meeting, jour fixe, or group discussion about (1) how to han-
dle or improve system access and passwords (e.g., use of a password safe, a general department access 
for emergencies); and (2) how to handle or improve data sharing (e.g., allowing file sharing to a pri-
vate email when files are encrypted, allowing cloud storage usage or providing an own private cloud).  
Stewardship behavior was coded as 1, when a participant did not follow the request in the email but 
informed the requester she is engaging in behaviors not accepted by organizational ISPs. As opposed 
to helping, stewardship is characterized by not providing any viable other solutions in support of the 
work of the requester but is, as per definition, aimed at prohibitive influence against inappropriate ac-
tivities to avoid harm (Van Dyne et al., 1995).  
Whistleblowing behavior was coded as 1, when a participant did not follow the request in the email 
and reported the request to the appropriate authority (Van Dyne et al., 1995), in our case the supervisor 
or the IT helpdesk (e.g., “I fear the colleague is doing something reckless. Please inform our CISO so 
that he points our ISPs out again to him.”). 
In conclusion, our five latent constructs of in-role behavior, helping, voice, stewardship, and whistle-
blowing are single-item constructs measured by the mean behavior within the nine emails mentioned 
in the study design section. Table 4 presents the measurement items for the latent constructs of general 
ISA and ISP awareness, which we adopted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010). The Big Five personality traits 
were used as controls and were measured by the ten-item Big Five Inventory (Rammstedt and John, 
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2007), which is an abbreviated version of the well-established Big Five Inventory (John et al., 1991). 
It assesses the Big Five (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness) 
with two items per factor, one keyed in the positive and one in the negative direction. 
 
Constructs Item 
General 
ISA 
Overall, I am aware of the potential threats to IS security and the protection of sensible 
data and their negative consequences. 
I have sufficient knowledge about the cost of potential security and privacy problems. 
I understand the concerns regarding information security and privacy and the risks they 
pose in general. 
ISP  
awareness 
I know the rules and regulations prescribed by the information security and privacy poli-
cies of my organization.  
I understand the rules and regulations prescribed by the information security and privacy 
policies of my organization. 
I know my responsibilities as prescribed in the information security and privacy policies 
to enhance the IS security and privacy of my organization. 
Note: All scales ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.  
Table 4. Measurement Items of Information Security Awareness 
5 Analysis and Results 
5.1 Measurement model 
In our data analysis, we selected the structural equation modelling approach Partial Least Squares 
(PLS), which is a common regression technique for measuring both measurement and a structural 
models (Chin, 1998). PLS yields solid results for small to medium sample sizes and can be used to test 
and validate explanatory models (Chin, 1998). We used the software SmartPLS version 3 for PLS path 
modelling (Ringle et al., 2015). To assess and evaluate the reflective constructs of the measurement 
model, their reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity were analyzed (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2006). Table 5 provides the reliability statistics, average variance extracted 
(AVE), and correlations of the constructs. 
 
 Load
ings 
CA CR AVE Correlations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
General ISA 0.92 
0.93 0.96 0.88 0.94       
0.93 
0.96 
ISP awareness 0.74 
0.60 0.77 0.54 0.36 0.73      
0.81 
0.64 
In-Role S.I. S.I. S.I. S.I. 0.41 0.42 S.I.     
Helping S.I. S.I. S.I. S.I. 0.20 0.26 0.37 S.I.    
Voice S.I. S.I. S.I. S.I. -0.12 0.05 -0.10 0.02 S.I.   
Stewardship S.I. S.I. S.I. S.I. 0.21 0.32 0.35 0.22 0.09 S.I.  
Whistleblowing S.I. S.I. S.I. S.I. -0.02 0.17 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.13 S.I. 
CA: Cronbach’s alpha; CR: composite reliability; AVE: average variance extracted; S.I.: single item. 
The diagonal elements (in bold) represent the square root of AVE. 
Table 5. Loadings, Cronbach’s α, Composite Reliability, Average Variance Extracted, and 
Correlations 
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We assessed measurement reliability based on both Cronbach’s alpha (CA) and composite reliability 
(CR). As shown in Table 5, both composite reliability measures exceeded the cutoff values of 0.6. We 
assessed the convergent and discriminant validity of the reflective constructs using four methods: (1) 
the square root of the AVE of all constructs were much larger than all other cross-correlations; (2) all 
AVEs were above 0.50; (3) the correlations among all constructs were below the 0.90 threshold; and 
(4) all items loaded higher on their intended constructs (cross-loadings can be requested from the au-
thors) (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2006). Altogether, these four criteria indicated appropriate convergent 
and discriminant validity. 
5.2 Structural model  
The structural model testing results are shown in Figure 1, including estimates of the path coefficients, 
their significance, and the amount of variances explained (R²). Based on our hypotheses, we tested the 
individual impacts of general ISA and ISP awareness on both extra-role and in-role security behaviors. 
General ISA was found to affect in-role security behavior (ß = 0.259; t = 2.363), promotive extra-role 
security behavior of helping (ß = 0.246; t = 2.520), but not the promotive extra-role security behavior 
of voice (ß = -0.104; t = 1.114). ISP awareness was found to affect in-role security behavior (ß = 
0.260; t = 2.651), prohibitive extra-role security behavior of stewardship (ß = 0.265; t = 2.920), and 
whistle-blowing (ß = 0.228; t = 3.185). Hence, with the exception of H2b, all proposed hypotheses 
were supported. With regard to our control variables, gender, age, and all but one Big Five personality 
traits were not significant on behaviors. Only employees’ voice behavior decreased with the personali-
ty trait openness (β = -0.315, t = 3.014). Furthermore, the combined variance explained by general 
ISA, ISP awareness and controls was 31.0% for in-role security behavior. General ISA and controls 
explained 9.0% of variance for helping and 13.0% for voice, whereas ISP awareness and controls ex-
plained 14.0% of variance for stewardship and 11.0% for whistle-blowing. 
 
H2a: 0.246**
H3a: 0.265**
H2b: -0.104 n.s.
H3b: 0.228**
In-role security 
behavior
(R² = 0.31)
H1b: 0.260**
H1a: 0.259**
*** p<0.001
** p<0.01
* p<0.05; 
n.s. non-significant
Helping
(R² = 0.09)
Voice
(R² = 0.13)
Promotive extra-role 
security behaviors
Stewardship
(R² = 0.14)
Reporting
(R² = 0.11)
Prohibitive extra-role 
security behaviors
General 
information 
security 
awareness
Information 
security policy 
awareness
Information 
security awareness
 
Figure 1. Overall Model Results 
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6 Discussion 
The aim of our study was to determine whether employees’ ISA (conceptualized by general ISA and 
ISP awareness) has an effect on their extra-role security behaviors, on top of their in-role security be-
haviors. With the help of an elaborated field study, we found that general ISA influences both in-role 
security behaviors and the promotive extra-role security behavior of helping, but not voicing. Further 
we found that ISP awareness influences both in-role security behaviors and the prohibitive extra-role 
security behaviors of stewardship and whistleblowing. Thus, the results largely confirmed our expecta-
tion that information security awareness plays also an important role in driving extra-role security be-
haviors, in addition to in-role security behaviors.  
The nonsignificant relationship between general ISA and voice as well as the negative significant rela-
tionship between the personality trait openness and voice is contrary to our expectations. Therefore, 
we revisited the voice literature in search of a potential explanation for these two unexpected results. 
Several voice theorists (e.g., Detert and Burris, 2007; Detert and Treviño, 2010; Tucker et al., 2008) 
have argued that management support is a critical contextual influence, because when the receivers 
(e.g., superiors) send signals that they are not interested in and willing to act on voice, employees’ 
willingness to speak up declines (Detert and Burris, 2007). Thus we tested whether management sup-
port moderates the influence of general ISA and openness to change on voice. The rationale is that 
when employees perceive upper-level support for information security efforts to be absent, employees 
may be reluctant to voice despite having a high general ISA and being more open to experience. Prior 
information security researchers have also detailed the importance of management support to accom-
plishing major tasks and changes with respect to ISP compliance (Hu et al., 2012). The findings of our 
post hoc analysis (see Appendix) suggest that employees may be reluctant to voice their thoughts de-
spite being aware of problems and being open to experience when they perceive that the receiver is not 
open to or appreciates information security, and is thus unable or unwilling to respond effectively to 
voice.  
6.1 Implications for research 
Our study offers several findings that provide interesting implications to research on information secu-
rity. As a rising number of (security-aware) employees may find their workplace or organization to be 
internally threated by their colleagues, there is a need for researchers to explain their behavioral re-
sponses to these threats. While extant behavioral research has primarily established that employees’ 
ISA is a major driver of their own in-role security behavior, such as ISP compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010), our study extents prior research by introducing awareness as a significant determinant of three 
extra-role security behaviors, i.e. helping, stewardship, and whistleblowing.  
This opens the floor for a debate on how ISA might spread in organizations. When security-aware em-
ployees perform affiliative extra-role security behaviors, such as helping or stewardship, to those less 
aware colleagues, it might have a contagious effect that it in turn also raises their awareness until they 
are also capable and willing to assist or direct others. However when it comes to challenging extra-role 
security behaviors, such as voicing and whistleblowing, the felt obligation of security-aware employ-
ees for challenging the organization’s status quo for a change is, according to our results, rather fo-
cused in stopping or preventing harm (i.e., whistle-blowing) than realizing new possibilities (i.e., voic-
ing).  
We also extend prior research on extra-role security behavior. In collaborative working environments, 
employees are actors in a social network, where its performance is determined by the combination of 
each individual’s efforts. Particularly, “weak links” in an organization’s information security chain 
may undermine their organization’s security by failing to perform specified ISP behaviors. Thus, it is 
important to gain an understanding of how these weak links can be reinforced to the degree that ISPs 
are followed and incidents are reduced. Prior research has established that ISP effectiveness increases 
when employees help each other and perform voicing behaviors (Hsu et al., 2015), which are both 
promotive behaviors. We contribute by additionally showing that employees also perform prohibitive 
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extra-role security behaviors in the form of stewardship and whistleblowing, when they are aware of 
their organization’s ISPs.  
Finally, most studies used very static and generic measures for in-role security behavior, like ISP 
compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Putri and Hovav, 2014) or ISP violation intentions (D'Arcy et al., 
2009; Hovav and D’Arcy, 2012), and extra-role security behavior (Hsu et al., 2015). In our study, we 
draw from objective and situation-specific behavioral data, i.e. particular behavioral reactions at the 
moment that a security-related event occurs. This data set provides a rich array of different actions 
employees may perform in response to potentially threatening requests. 
6.2 Implications for practice 
This study also offers several implications for practitioners interested in the improvement of organiza-
tional information security. First, this research acknowledges that raising both general ISA and ISP 
awareness is a first step in trying to motivate employees to perform security-related behaviors that are 
in line with an organization’s ISPs. However, organizations should not solely focus on encouraging in-
role security behaviors, but should also encourage their employees to perform extra-role security be-
haviors. 
The simultaneous coexistence of different types of employees presents a unique challenge for manag-
ers responsible for managing organization-wide information security. Our results could be used as an 
initial taxonomy that managers can use to identify and classify different security actors in the organi-
zation. Security champions (high levels of ISA and extra-role security behaviors) are employees who 
beyond their job description voluntarily take extraordinary interest in information security and could 
serve as role models of information security. They could influence security beginners, i.e., employees 
who fail to comply due to a lack of awareness (low levels of ISA and in-role security behaviors). Or-
ganizations could leverage security champions by pairing them with security beginners in a mentoring 
program, where the former could provide a one-on-one coaching to the latter and serve as contact per-
son after the coaching.  
When practitioners are interested in encouraging promotive extra-role security behaviors our findings 
indicate that general ISA should be raised. Examples of prominent security breaches that occurred in-
side the organization (or at another), where one individual’s actions affected the whole department or 
company, could be presented in group meetings or newsletters. As an illustration, a single email sent 
to a single user with access to group drives can lead to a mass of encrypted data being held for ransom, 
as was the case in many companies affected by the notorious Locky ransomware attacks (Mathews, 
2017). Providing employees with a deeper understanding of interdependencies of how others’ actions 
may also affect them or their own work, should then serve as a motivator to help less capable employ-
ees more effectively and securely.  
Also if encouraging prohibitive extra-role security behaviors is of interest for practitioners, our find-
ings indicate that, besides general ISA, ISP awareness should be raised as well. Periodic security edu-
cation, training, and awareness (SETA) programs should strive to have employees recognize the ne-
cessity and usefulness of the ISPs’ prohibitions and requirements to ensure that employees fully un-
derstand their role and responsibility for upholding information security. The key point here is also to 
convince employees that directing others is wanted as the “strong link” protecting the “weak link” and 
consequently protecting the organization as a whole. Further, reporting bad behavior is not about 
pointing the finger at someone but is in the best interest of everyone, as it is about identifying and re-
solving undetected problems to prevent problematic behaviors from happening again. 
6.3 Limitations and future research 
When interpreting our results some limitations need to be considered. First, it is difficult to know the 
extent to which realism was maintained, although we designed our scenario of completing 20 emails in 
a work environment as realistic and contextually relevant as possible. However, since participants’ 
behavior was recorded, we need to address the issue that participant’s in-role and extra-role security 
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behavior in the study may differ from natural behavior. Second, the process of coding in-role security 
behaviors and the four extra-role security behaviors was limited to the manual evaluation of screen 
recordings (all performed actions such as email deletion, archiving, the content of the response emails, 
actions on the desktop such as opening and installing downloaded files, etc.). Even though we tried to 
prevent subjectivity while reviewing and coding data, there is still a risk that some of our own biases 
might have influenced the process. However, we were conscious about that risk and in identifying in-
role security behaviors we cross-checked our codings with items identified in Posey et al. (2013)’s 
taxonomy for protection-motivated behaviors. In coding extra-role security behaviors we focused on 
the four extra-role behaviors proposed by Van Dyne et al. (1995). Thus, future research could explore 
other types of extra-role behaviors, such as functional participation, task revision, or principled dissent 
(Van Dyne et al., 1995). Another interesting avenue to further study employees’ sense of responsibil-
ity or obligation and its effect on extra-role security behaviors could be to consider the role of psycho-
logical ownership. In an organizational context, Van Dyne and Pierce (2004) proposed that psycholog-
ical ownership would be related to extra-role behaviors. Prior work also suggests that psychological 
ownership may manifest in differing levels of security behaviors, in particular that ownership may 
even exert a relatively stronger influence on optional (i.e., extra-role) security behaviors (Anderson 
and Agarwal, 2010; Thompson et al., 2017). Thus, the model could be further extended by considering 
the role of psychological ownership for extra-role security behaviors. Third, this research was limited 
to internal threats related to unsafe data handling (unsecure transfer and storage), password handling 
(sharing with individuals or a group), and unauthorized software use. Future studies could improve the 
generalizability of our findings in other settings. Fourth, our sample had a high representation towards 
financial services staff with fewer participants from other industries. As financial services staff may 
pay more attention to data protection (due to the nature of the data that they handle, or also due to in-
dustry requirements), future research should ensure a more balanced sample between different indus-
tries. Last, our field study was geographically confined to Western Europe, thereby potentially ne-
glecting cultural differences. Hence, to generalize the findings, future research is needed to account for 
cultural differences, for instance with regard to cultural values (e.g., individualism vs. collectivism), 
which may be of particular interest for multinational organizations.  
Appendix 
For the post hoc analysis, we split the sample into two groups based on the median of the variable 
management support (Hu et al., 2012): higher management support (i.e., those that viewed the man-
agement “more” supporting with respect to information security), and lower management support (i.e., 
those that viewed the management “less” supporting with respect to information security). Separate 
PLS models were run for each subgroup. The results indicate that for the lower management support 
group, general ISA has a significant negative effect on voice (ß = -0.263, p < 0.05), but not for the 
higher management support group (ß = 0.044, n.s.). In the same way, for the lower management sup-
port group, openness to change has a significant negative effect on voice (ß = -0.356, p < 0.05), but not 
for the higher management support group (ß = -0.228, n.s.). The findings are discussed in the discus-
sion section. 
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